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RECKONING WITH EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN A "POST RACIAL" ERA
DAVID A. LACY*
ALEXANDRA S. RAY**
INTRODUCTION
"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in
an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.
Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly."I In this statement, Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr. explains the fundamental need to achieve equality
in society, and recognizes that discrimination, in even its most microscopic
forms, must be eradicated. Almost fifty years after Dr. King made this
statement, discrimination continues to permeate our society, including
within the workplace despite the fact that many claim we are now living in
a post-racial society. In the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which, through Title VII of the Act,
prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the
basis of their race and other prohibited characteristics. 2 By making it illegal
for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, in hiring and other
employment decisions, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 had a
significant impact on overt discrimination. As a result, open discrimination
such as hanging a noose in the workplace or blatantly stating "We do not
hire blacks," no longer permeate throughout a place of business. However,
while such overt forms of discrimination have dissolved, significant
LL.M., 2003, American University Washington College of Law; J.D., 1996, University of Florida
College of Law; B.S., 1993, University of Maryland University College.
Law Student at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. Expected graduation May
2011.
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted at African Studies
Center, Univ. of Penn., available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArticlesGen/LetterBirmingham.
html.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2011). Title VII prohibits race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin. It also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to administer and enforce the statute. Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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discrimination in its more subtle form remains a pervasive factor. Because
discrimination occurs more often in a form that is not overt, such as
discriminatory appearance standards that appear neutral on their face, and
other workplace decisions that appear on their face to be neutral, many
claim we are now living in a post racial society.
Many recognize and accept that there are certain forms of discrimination
that will occur throughout the employment process and influence the
employer, whether in the initial hiring stages or when terminating an
employee. However, such discrimination is "accepted" only to a limited
extent.4 Under Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual
"with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment" by deciding not to hire or in deciding to fire an individual
because of his or her race. 5 In such situations the employee may bring a
discrimination claim against the employer.6
Under Title VII, there are two main theories of discrimination upon
which an aggrieved employee may bring suit against its employer,
disparate treatment and disparate impact.7 Although discrimination is
prohibited through various Federal laws, Title VII legislation does not
provide a statutory definition of 'discrimination.' 8 Consequently, the
Courts have been afforded wide discretion in crafting what encompasses
unlawful racial discrimination.
This article seeks to examine Title VII's approach to individual race
discrimination claims in the employment setting in this post-racial era by
looking at the race discrimination laws in two other national jurisdictions:
Australia and the United Kingdom. In evaluating each countries approach,
we will examine relevant legislation and case law. While the case law will
provide insight into bringing an employment discrimination claim, because
of the factual complexity of employment discrimination cases, the focus
will not be on the factual distinction amongst the cases but rather on the
burden of proof required and the Court's allocation of that burden.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
6 This paper will not discuss the administrative process used by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Council (EEOC).
7 ROBERT BELTON, DIANNE AVERY, MARIA L. ONTIVEROS & ROBERTO L. CORRADA,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE, 66
(7th ed. 2004).
8 Id. at 68. Congress defined discrimination for the first time within the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), as "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2011).
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The first part of the article will provide an overview of racial
discrimination legislation in the United States and a brief discussion of two
theories of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment and (2) disparate
impact. 9 It will also provide an overview of the allocation of the burden of
proof in U.S. employment law. The allocation of the burden of proof is
critical because it can play a determinative role as to which party succeeds
in litigation, especially in what people consider a post-racial era. The
second part of the article will provide an analysis of the key legislation and
case law in Australia and the United Kingdom, examining the allocation of
the burden of proof in each country. The third part of the article will
propose a reform to the method of proving a claim of racial discrimination
in the U.S. by examining the current approach in the U.S., in light of this so
called post-racial era and the approaches used in Australia and the U.K.
Based upon this examination, the U.S. should adopt an approach similar to
the approach implemented in the U.K. and shift the burden of proof from
the complainant employee to the respondent-employer once the
complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Shifting
the burden of proof to the employer would require the employer to prove a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, instead of proving that
the conduct was not discriminatory.
I. UNITED STATES
A. Racial Discrimination Overview
As discussed above, there are two principal theories of discrimination
prohibited under Title VII, disparate treatment and disparate impact.10 The
Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States defined
both concepts.II Disparate treatment is based on the judicial construction of
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.12 It encompasses .situations where the
employer treats an employee less favorably than its other employees
9 For the purpose of this article, the central focus will be on individual disparate treatment claims of
race discrimination. Additionally, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss possible defenses
available to the employer.
10 It should be noted that disparate treatment and disparate impact are not the only forms of
discrimination prohibited under Title VII.
11 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (defining disparate treatment as an employer treating "some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" and
defining disparate impact as "employment practices that are factually neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in face fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity").
12 See BELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 67 (explaining that the theory of disparate treatment derives
from judicial construction of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII).
2011] 43
44 JOURNALOFCIVLRIGHIS & ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:1
because of race.13 Disparate treatment is often described as the easiest form
of discrimination to comprehend.14 A key issue with disparate treatment
claims is determining whether the employer's adverse conduct was based
on lawful or unlawful reasons. 15 Hence the employer's liability hinges on
"whether the protected trait .. .actually motivated the employer's
decision."16 As a requirement in proving an individual case of disparate
treatment discrimination, the employee must show that the employer had a
discriminatory motive. 17 On the other hand, disparate impact claims
involve an employee challenging an employer's employment practice, that
while on its face it appears to be neutral in its treatment of different racial
groups, in practice it falls more harshly on members of the plaintiffs group
than another, and its disparate impact cannot be justified as a business
necessity.18 In addition, in proving a disparate impact case, unlike with
disparate treatment cases, proof of discriminatory motive is not essential.19
Within the disparate treatment theory, there are five analytical schemes
to prove discriminatory treatment by the employer based on race. The five
schemes include the single-motive or pretext scheme, the mixed-or-dual
motive scheme, the after-acquired evidence scheme, the scheme for
pattern-or-practice cases, and that for affirmative action cases. 20 While the
employee is not mandated to identify which analytical scheme he or she is
relying on, the District Court must make a determination during the trial in
order to either make a ruling on the merits of the case if in a bench trial, or
to provide the jury with the appropriate jury instructions. 21 The focus of
this paper is the first scheme, single-motive or pretext cases.
There are two categories of evidence an employee can use in establishing
an individual disparate treatment claim of discrimination: (1) direct
evidence and (2) circumstantial evidence.22 Direct evidence is "evidence
13 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (clarifying that disparate
treatment occurs when an employee is treated less favorably by his employer simply because of his
race).
14 See id. (identifying disparate treatment as the "most easily understood type of discrimination").
15 See BELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 68 (revealing that the issue to be determined in disparate
treatment cases is whether the adverse employment practice was the result of "unlawful discriminatory
motivation").
16 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
17 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 (defining disparate treatment discrimination).
18 Id. (distinguishing between disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact claims).
19 Id.
20 BELTON ET. AL., supra note 7.
21 Id.
22 An employee may prove its case under either the framework establish in McDonnell Douglas-
Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or under the mixed-motive analytical scheme. For purposes of this
paper, the discussion will focus on the McDonnell Douglas single-motive, or pretext, framework. The
other analytical schemes were introduced above.
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that decision-makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate
criterion in reaching their decision." 23 Also described as "smoking gun
evidence," direct evidence usually consists of comments directed at the
employee or written documents prepared by the employer, that provide a
direct connection between the employer's discriminatory intent and the
refusal to hire or retain the employee.24 Today, it is exceedingly rare for an
aggrieved employee to have direct evidence of discrimination, because few
employers openly display their discriminatory intent and practices. As
Professor Calloway observes, "most people are smart enough to avoid
providing direct evidence of discriminatory intent." 25
However, the court has asserted that Title VII prohibits both overt and
subtle discrimination. Therefore, in recognizing the rarity of direct
evidence in single-motive claims, absent the occasional inept employer
who maintained documentary evidence or directly verbalized its disdain for
the employee because of his or her race, the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green delineated a methodology for proving race
discrimination by circumstantial evidence. 26
B. Burden ofProof
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court outlined a four-pronged
analytical framework for individual disparate treatment claims based on
circumstantial evidence. 27 In outlining the allocation of the burden of
proof, the court created a burden-shifting framework where the employee
carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. 28 The employee can establish its prima facie case by
showing that:
(i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
23 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278 (1989) (O'Connor J, concurring).
24 Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories and Realities, 46
ALA. L. REv. 375, 432 (1995).
25 Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26
CONN. L. REv. 997, 1037 (1994).
26 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (outlining a test to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, and the requirements to shift the burden of proof).
27 Id. at 802-03.
28 See id. at 802. If the case goes before a jury, the judge will not provide the jurors with this
elaborate framework as part of the jury instructions. The ultimate issue for the jury is whether or not the
defendant took the adverse employment action because of the plaintiffs membership in a protected
class.
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rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 29
Depending upon the factual circumstances of the case, the factors required
to prove the prima facie case may vary. 30 The factors proscribed in
McDonnell Douglas, for satisfying the prima facie case, were "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." 31 The Supreme Court
explained that where the employee establishes its prima facie case, he or
she raises a presumption of discrimination. 32 The court reasoned that such a
presumption is allowed because "these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 33
Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for its actions towards the employee. 34 The court outlined the extent of the
employer's burden in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine.35 To carry its burden, the employer must present a "clear and
reasonably specific" explanation. 36 The ultimate burden of persuasion,
however, remains with the employee at all times throughout the litigation.37
Therefore, the employer is not required to prove that it did not discriminate;
rather it need merely articulate a legal, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Moreover, the court does not require the defendant to convince the
court that its proffered reasons were the actual motivating reasons behind
its decision.38 Where the employer neglects to offer an explanation, though,
the court is required to make a finding of unlawful discrimination because
the employer failed to rebut the presumption raised by the prima facie
29 Id. at 802.
30 See id. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.").
31 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
32 See id. ("A prima facie case ... raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts . . .
33 See id.
34 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the burden-shifting regime).
35 See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1980) (holding that the
employer is subject only to a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 253 (stating that the employee has the ultimate burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but a pretext
for discrimination).
38 See id. at 254 ("The burden that shifts to the [employer] . . . to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that the [employee] was rejected . . . for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."); see also Bd. of Trustees. v. Sweeney, 403 U.S. 24, 25 (emphasizing the
difference between merely articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and proving absence
of discriminatory motive).
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case.39
If the employer successfully rebuts the employee's prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts back to the employee to provide him or her
with a fair opportunity to persuade the court that the reasons articulated by
the employer were simply a pretext for discrimination. 40 The employee
may prove the reason was merely a pretext "either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." 4 1 If the defendant carries its burden, the employee
in establishing the third prong of the analysis is no longer operating under
the presumption of discrimination at the prima facie stage.42
While the evidentiary value of an employee's proven prima facie case is
significant in the face of the employer's silence, that significance is non-
existent in the face of a mere articulation by the employer. The current
requirement of simply articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
provides the employer with an exceptionally low burden of production.
The effects of the employer's low burden of production were compounded
by the Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.43
The principal issue in Hicks focused on the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 44 In Hicks, the court reconfirmed the first and second
prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework, namely the prima facie case
and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; however, it considerably
increased the employee's burden in the third prong or pretext.45 Prior to the
Hicks decision, in order to establish that the employer's reason is merely a
pretext for discrimination, the employee had the ability to show the court
the employer's proffered reason was unworthy of credence or that the
employer was actually motivated by discrimination.46 Under this rule,
where the employee proved the employer's reason was a pretext, that was
sufficient to find in favor of the employee. However, after Hicks, to carry
its burden under the third prong, merely proving the employer's reason was
39 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (citing DAVID LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 67, 536 (1977)).
40 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) ("While Title VII does not . .
compel rehiring of [the employee], neither does it permit [the employer] to use [the employee's]
conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by § 703(a)(1).").
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
42 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (noting that at this point, the shifted burden of production becomes
irrelevant because the employee carries the ultimate burden of persuasion).
43 See id
44 See id.
45 See id
46 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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pretextual is insufficient. 47 Rather, the employee must prove the reason was
a pretext for discrimination.48 The court in Hicks explained that pretext for
discrimination requires that the employee show "both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason." 49 The ability of the
employer to discharge its burden by simply articulating its reason,
combined with the increased evidentiary burden imposed upon the
employee by the Hicks court, has significantly heightened the difficulty for
the employee.
The court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc. abandoned what
appeared to be this pretext-plus approach from Hicks, and clarified the
proper analysis of the third prong of the circumstantial evidence framework
in single-motive cases. 50 The employee's "prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false,
may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated." 51 While the combination of an employee's prima facie case
and proof that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence does not
automatically establish intentional discrimination, the court explained those
occurrences involve situations where "no rational fact finder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory." 52 While the United States
requires this framework, other countries around the world require a greater
burden on the employer once the employee has met its burden.
II. AUSTRALIA
The Australian Constitution 53 does not provide protection against racial
discrimination, however under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(hereinafter RDA), Australian law prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee on racial grounds. 54 The RDA was
adopted in 1975 and represents Australia's first Federal human rights law
protecting against discrimination.55
47 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08.
48 See id
49 See id. at 515. The showing adopted in Hicks, has been articulated as "pretext-plus." Pre-text
plus in employment discrimination cases makes reference to the requirement on the employee to present
evidence that the employer's explanation was false, in addition to the prima facie case, in order to
obtain a jury verdict of intentional discrimination. Id.
50 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000).
51 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135.
52 Id
53 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 117 (explaining that state residency discrimination is the only
form of protection against discrimination that is recognized under the Australian Constitution).
54 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 s 9 (Austl.).
55 Beth Gaze, Has the Racial Discrimination Act Contributed to Eliminating Racial
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Racial discrimination is defined in Article I, Paragraph I of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (the Convention), 56 which has been codified under section
9(1) of the RDA.57 Section 9(1) prescribes the meaning of direct
discrimination. 58 Direct discrimination encompasses discriminatory
practices, both in form and in effect, that involve the imposition of acts
involving a distinction. 59 The RDA prescribes racial discrimination to be
unlawful where:
a person [does] any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction
or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any
human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life.60
The statutes' reference to 'human right or fundamental freedom' is derived
from Article 5 of the Convention, which includes the right to work and free
choice of employment, just and favorable work conditions and other
employment law related concerns. 61 Additionally, under the RDA it is an
offense to discriminate in employment and a host of other areas, including
housing and in the provision of goods and services. 62
Complainants in Australia are subjected to an extreme burden in
attempting to prove that their employer unlawfully discriminated against
them on racial grounds. In Australia, the complainant must establish, on
the balance of probabilities, that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against them on racial grounds. 63
A. Australian Burden ofProof- Briginshaw Standard
Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, the Australian
Discrimination? Analyzing the Litigation Track Record 2000-04, 11 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 171 (2005).
56 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. I, Para.
1, G.A. Res. 2106(XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965), available at http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/law/cerd.htm#partl.
57 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 s 9 (1) (Austl.).
58 See Ebber v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm'n [ 1995] 129 ALR 455 (Austl.).
59 See id.
60 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 s 9 (1) (Austi.).
61 See Convention, supra note 56 at Art. 5(e); see also Qantas Airways Ltd. v Gama [2008] 101
ALD 459, para 55 (Austl.).
62 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 ss 9, 10-16 (Austl.).
63 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 s 9 (1) (Austl.).
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complainant bears the entire burden of proof.64 The Australian system does
not require the respondent employer to produce any evidence to disprove
the complainant's allegations or, alternatively, to offer an explanation for
its actions. 65 This approach stems from the general belief that an allegation
of racial discrimination is a serious matter that is 'not lightly to be
inferred.' 66 In Sharma v. Legal Aid Queensland, the Federal Court of
Australia reiterated that when determining whether an employer's action
constituted a breach of the RDA, the standard of proof is the standard
promulgated in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw.67 The question before the court
in Briginshaw dealt with ascertaining the appropriate standard of proof
required to prove adultery in a civil proceeding for dissolution of a
marriage. 68 The court held that a complainant must establish its allegation
to the "reasonable satisfaction" of the tribunal.69 In Australia, tribunals are
instructed that in concluding that a complainant has made out its case of
racial discrimination to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal, the
nature and consequences of the fact(s) to be proved must be taken into
consideration.70 Factors that influence a reasonable satisfaction finding,
include "the seriousness of the allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood
of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences
flowing from a particular finding." 71
Under this approach, the degree of satisfaction required by a tribunal in
civil proceedings, such as racial discrimination claims, "may, not must be
based on a preponderance of probability." 72 While the court argued that the
standard articulated in Briginshaw did not develop a new standard of
persuasion, it stated that the nature of the issue, or the seriousness of the
allegation, impacts the courts' process by which reasonable satisfaction is
determined.73 The correlation between what the standard of proof in a civil
6 See Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] 60 CLR 336, 362 (Austl.) (stating the differences between
burden of proof for the United States and Australia).
65 See Dominique Allen, Reducing the Burden of Proving Discrimination in Australia 31 SYDNEY
L. REV. 579, 584 (Dec. 2009).
66 See De Plevitz, The Briginshaw 'Standard of Proof' in Anti-Discrimination Law: 'Pointing with
a Wavering Finger.' 27 MEL. U.L.R. 308, 319; see also Dep't of Health v Arumugam [1987] VR 319,
*31, 35 (contrasting the Briginshaw test).
67 See Briginshaw, 60 CLR at 361-62; see also Sharma v. Legal Aid Queensland [2002] FCAFC
196, para. 40 (Austl.).
68 See Briginshaw, 60 CLR at 341.
69 See id at 362.
70 See id
71 Id.
72 Id. at 363. But cf Thermoid Rubber Co. v. Bank of Greenwood, 1 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1924)
(explaining that in civil cases a preponderance of the evidence is required to sustain a verdict).
73 See Briginshaw 60 CLR at 363.
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proceeding is and the factors that the tribunal can consider, as articulated in
Briginshaw, are codified in the Evidence Act, which states:
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party
proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the
balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into
account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into
account:
(a) The nature of the cause of action or defense; and
(b) The nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c) The gravity of the matters alleged.74
This Briginshaw standard has been consistently applied to racial
discrimination complaints as a 'matter of course.' 75
The higher evidentiary standard has been justified, on the basis that the
standard is not applicable in all cases. 76 For example, in G v. H, the court
found the Briginshaw standard did not apply where the issue of the case
dealt with the paternity of a child.77 The court clarified that where the case
involves an allegation of fraud, criminal or moral wrongdoing, the
application of the Briginshaw standard is relevant. 78 Furthermore, the court
stated that "due regard must be had" to the nature of the issue involved
because "[n]ot every case involves issues of importance and gravity in the
Briginshaw v. Briginshaw sense."79 In such grave situations, the Australian
courts find it permissible to fluctuate on the degree of evidence it will
require from a complainant in determining whether it is reasonably
satisfied from the facts presented, that the respondent unlawfully
discriminated against the complainant on racial grounds.80
In light of the varying complexity of the issues that arise in civil
proceedings, the Briginshaw standard becomes relevant only when the
allegations are of such a serious nature that it is necessary for the trier of
74 Evidence Act 1995 (N.S.W. ACTS) s 140(1)-(2).
75 See De Plevitz, supra note 66, at 318.
76 See Cubillo v Cth. of Austl. [2000] 174 ALR 97; see also G v H [1994] 181 CLR 387, 399
(Austi.).
77 G v H [1994] 181 CLR at 399.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Victoria v Macedonian Teachers Ass'n of Victoria Inc. [1999] FCR 1287 (Austl.) (applying
the Briginshaw test, "requiring the degree of satisfaction to be up to the seriousness of the allegations in
all the circumstances.") (quoting Dep't of Health v. Arumugam [1998] V.R. 319 (Austl.)).
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fact to proceed with caution in concluding that it is reasonably satisfied.81
However, according to the Australian Human Rights Commission, the
courts are applying the Briginshaw standard to racial discrimination cases
without analyzing how serious the allegation is or what consequences
would flow from a finding of discrimination. 82 When the tribunals are
presented with a racial discrimination complaint, the allegations are
generally regarded as having such seriousness that the Briginshaw standard
is required.83
III. UNITED KINGDOM
In the U.K., the Race Relations Act of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as
RRA) provides that an individual who believes that he or she has been
discriminated against at their place of employment on racial grounds, may
make a complaint against the employer to an Employment Tribunal. 84 In
creating the RRA, the U.K. looked to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
guidance.85 Under the RRA, a complainant can seek redress for either
direct or indirect discrimination. 86 Direct race discrimination encapsulates
circumstances where the employer subjects the individual to treatment less
favorable than how he would treat other persons. 87 Section 4(1) of the
RRA, extends the prohibition against discrimination to the employment
field, providing that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
another in determining who should be offered employment, in determining
the terms of employment or by refusing to offer employment to the
individual.88
81 Macedonian Teachers, [1999] FCR 1287 ("The Briginshaw test only becomes relevant when,
because of the seriousness of the allegations being made in relation to an issue to be determined in a
particular case, a decision maker must proceed with caution in arriving at a state of satisfaction.").
82 See Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. An International Comparison of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975: Background Paper No. 1 (2008) 93. See, e.g., Sharma v. Legal Aid
Queensland [2002] FCAFC 196, para. 40 (Austl.).
83 See Hunyor, J, Skin-deep: Proof and Inferences of Racial Discrimination in Employment, 25
SYDNEY L. REv. 535, 540 (2003).
84 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (Eng.), Section 3 of the RRA define racial grounds as including
colour and race.
85 See Shari Engels, Problems of Proof in Employment Discrimination: The Need For A Clearer
Definition of Standards in the United States and the United Kingdom, 15 CoMP. LAB. L. 340, 341 n. 6
(1994).
86 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, §§ 1(1)-l(1A) (Eng.).
87 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 1(1)(a) (Eng.). Indirect discrimination, though not the focus
of this paper, encapsulates circumstances where the employer applies a provision, criterion or practice
that is facially neutral, however places individuals in the same racial group as the claimant at a
particular advantage, in comparison to other individuals not of that group.
88 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 4(1) (Eng.); King v. Great Britain-China Centre, [1991]
EWCA (Civ) 16 [24] (Eng.).
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In discrimination cases, the complainant has an opportunity to send the
respondent a pre-tribunal race discrimination questionnaire, also known as
RRA s.65 Questionnaire, 89 presenting his or her claim alleging
discrimination and requesting the employer to provide an explanation for
its adverse action.90 Section 65(1) of the RRA states that the questionnaire
procedure was introduced: "With a view to helping a person ... who
considers he [sic] may have been discriminated against . .. in contravention
of this Act to decide whether to institute proceedings and, if he [sic] does
so, to formulate and present his case in the most effective manner." 91
Failure of the employer to issue a response within eight weeks, or issuing a
disingenuous response, allows the Employment Tribunal to draw an
inference of discrimination, if it hears the complaint. 92 While the
questionnaire procedure provides the advantage to the complainant of
assessing the merits of his case, the extent of such an advantage is
dependent on what questions he or she poses and the way in which the
questions are framed. 93
A. U.K. Pre-Statutory Changes
As a general rule, throughout the U.K., the burden of proof lies with the
person bringing the claim to prove their case against the other side.94
However, in the discrimination arena, there is a general recognition of the
particular difficulties facing the complainant, particularly in collecting
evidence of direct discrimination. 95 The approach followed by Employment
Tribunals in assessing whether direct discrimination had occurred in a
particular case, was for many years articulated by the Court of Appeal in
the case of King v. Great Britain-China Centre.96 The court was cognizant
of the difficulty of a complainant proving direct discrimination against its
employer.97 Where the complainant had established that he or she was
treated less favorably than others based on racial grounds, it was
"legitimate" for the Employment Tribunal, when the employer had failed to
89 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 65 (Eng.).
90 Allison Brown, Angus Erskine & Doris Littlejohn, Review ofJudgments in Race Discrimination
Employment Tribunal Cases, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS RESEARCH SERIES No. 64 at 12 (2006).
91 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 65(1) (Eng.).
92 Brown, supra note 90 at 12; Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 65(2)(b) (Eng.).
93 See Dominique Allen, Reducing the Burden of Proving Discrimination in Australia, 31 SYDNEY
L. REV. 579, 590 (2009).
94 See Engels, supra note 85, at 347-50.
95 See id
96 See King, [1991] EWCA (Civ) 16.
97 See id. at para. 31.
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offer an explanation or the explanation given was considered inadequate or
unsatisfactory, to draw an inference that the discrimination was on racial
grounds. 98 This permissible inference was viewed, not as a matter of law,
but as "almost common sense." 99 In reaching a conclusion, on the balance
of probabilities,100 that the employer's adverse action was on the basis of
race discrimination the Employment Tribunal should continually remain
aware of the difficulties facing a person who brings a discrimination
case. 101 This line of reasoning was subsequently approved by the House of
Lords in Glasgow v. City Council v. Zafar.102 The court in Glasgow
acknowledged the special problems of proof facing complainants,
particularly when the employer, discriminating on the basis of the
employees' race, will generally not broadcast such prejudices. 103 They
stressed, however, that Employment Tribunals retained discretion to
determine whether or not to draw an inference of race discrimination,
where an employer acted unreasonably and either presented no explanation
or an unsatisfactory explanation.104 While a number of cases following the
legislative amendments have continued to give credence to the proof
problems facing those complaining of discrimination, the legal landscape
of the requisite burden of proof for race discrimination cases, shifted.
B. Shifting Burden of Proof
The shift in the burden of proof represented a substantial change in U.K.
race discrimination legislation. The imposition of shifting the burden of
proof originated in sex discrimination cases.105 The European Council
Directive 97/80/EC initiated the shift, focusing its concern on the principle
of equal treatment, assuming individuals legal redress where they were
wronged on the basis of their sex. 106 The Directive created a burden of
proof in sex discrimination cases, providing that where a complainant
establishes facts from which the tribunal may presume that there has been
discrimination, whether direct or indirect, the onus falls upon the employer
98 Id at para. 36.
99 Id; North West Thames Regional Health Authority v. Noone, [1998] I.C.R. 813, 822 (Eng.).
100 The balance of probabilities is the requisite burden of proof in civil cases within the U.KC It is
equivalent to preponderance of evidence standard in the U.S.
101 See King, [1991] EWCA (Civ) 16, [36].
102 See Glasgow City Council v. Zafar, [ 1998] I.C.R. 120.
103 See id. at 125.
104 See id. at 123.
105 Council Directive 97/80, art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 14) 6, 8 (EC).
106 Council Directive 97/80, art. 1, 1997 0.J. (L 14) 6, 8 (EC). See Igen v. Wong, [2005] I.R.L.R.
258, para. 9 (Eng.).
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to prove that it did not discriminate against the employee and breach the
principle of equal treatment. 107 Though the burden of proof directive
originally did not apply to the U.K., its function was extended to pertain to
the U.K. in 1998108, and U.K. anti-discrimination legislation was changed
accordingly.109 Following the legislative amendments, the Employment
Appeal Tribunal, in Barton v. Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities
Ltd,110 articulated a number of principles to guide tribunals on how to
approach the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases.
An equivalent directive extended the practice of shifting the burden of
proof to race discrimination claims in employment law, 111 and led to
subsequent statutory changes to the RRA. 112 Confusion as to the extent of
the legislative changes initially ensued, particularly on whether the
amendments simply codified pre-existing law, as under King and Zafar.113
Subsequent decisions clarified that the legislative amendments altered the
existing practice in regards to drawing an inference of race
discrimination. 114 Specifically, the amendments eliminated the discretion
previously afforded Employment Tribunals, in deciding whether or not to
infer the presence of discrimination. 115 As such, the passage of the race
discrimination directive and the subsequent statutory codification under the
RRA, mandate that Employment Tribunals must uphold the employee's
discrimination complaint where the respondent employer fails to discharge
its burden. 116 Where the complainant has established its prima facie case on
the balance of probabilities, the burden of proof automatically shifts to the
107 See Council Directive 97/80, art. 4 (1), 1997 O.J. (L 14) 6, 8 (EC).
108 See Council Directive 98/52, 1998 O.J. (L. 205) 66 (EC).
109 See Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c. 65, §§ 63A, 66A (Eng.).
110 See Barton v. Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd., [2003] I.C.R. 1205, 1217-18.
IlI See Council Directive 2000/78, art. 10, 2000 0.J. (L 303) 16, 20 (EC).
112 See Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 54A (Eng.).
113 See Igen v. Wong, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 18 (Eng.) (noting the pre-existing law and that
"there was some debate before [the court] as to whether the statutory amendments merely codified the
pre-existing law or whether it had made a substantive change to the law.").
114 See id.; see also Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Ltd. v. Adebayo, [2005] I.R.L.R. 514 (Eng.)
(describing the rules in King and Zafar, ultimately determining that "there is no doubt that section 54A
and section 63A of the respective Acts introduced a new approach to determining complaints of direct
discrimination, which meant that the King guidelines required adjustment); Laing v. Manchester City
Council, [2006] I.C.R. 1519, para. 71 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.) (providing that "the amendment did
more than codify the existing law); Madarassy v. Noumra Int'l Plc., [2007] EWCA Civ 33 (Eng.)
(explaining that tribunals are now faced with amended statutory provisions, which changed the law).
115 See Igen [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 18; see also King v. Great Britain-China Center, [1991]
EWCA Civ 16 (holding that "[a]t the conclusion of all the evidence the trbunial should make findings
as to the primary facts and draw such inferences as they consider proper from those facts"); Strathclyde
Regional Council v. Zafar, [1997] UKHL 54 (finding that while King v. Great Britain-China Centre
implies that that an industrial tribunal has some discretion in drawing an inference of racial
discrimination, other cases suggest that the Tribunal should draw an inference of discrimination).
116 See Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 1.
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respondent.
In the seminal case, Igen v. Wong, the U.K. Court of Appeal outlined the
burden of proof, explaining its function and providing guidelines on the
proper procedure." 7 Igen included three simultaneous appeals from the
Employment Appeal Tribunal, raising questions about the correct
application of the statutory provisions shifting the burden of proof in direct
discrimination cases. 118 Igen was the first time the court interpreted the
"Barton guidance", 119 providing revised guidelines to assist Employment
Tribunals in applying the statutory provisions.120 The court found the
legislative amendments required Employment Tribunals to undergo a two-
stage process of analyzing the complainants' complaint, which it expressed
in guidelines nine and ten, describing the shift in the burden of proof to the
respondent employer as:
(9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which
conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the
claimant less favourably on the ground of [race], then the
burden of proof moves to the respondent.
(10) It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not
commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having
committed, the act. 121
In the first stage, the complainant must prove facts from which the
Employment Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate
explanation, that the respondent committed an unlawful act of
discrimination. 122 During this stage, the tribunal only has to find that, based
upon the facts presented, there could have been unlawful discrimination by
the employer.123 The court in Igen explained that in its prima facie case, the
complainant must prove all the elements of the offense, showing "facts
117 See id. (outlining that the "statutory amendments require the [Employment Tribunal] to go
through a two-stage process if the complaint of the complainant is to be upheld" and discussing the
burden-shifting during the process).
118 See id (providing that the three appeals were heard together and based on the burden of proof
provisions of the RRA and SDA).
119 See Barton, [2003] I.C.R. 1205, 1217-18.
120 See Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258 at Annex (U.K.). Of the thirteen articulated guidelines, the more
guidelines that are of particular relevance are guidelines (9)-(13).
121 Id
122 Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 17 (stating the "first stage requires the complainant to prove
facts from which the ET could, apart from the section, conclude in the absence of an adequate
explanation that the respondent has committed, or to treated as having committed, the unlawful act of
discrimination").
123 Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Ltd. v. Adebayo, [2005] I.R.L.R. 514 para. 36 (indicating that
"[a]t this first stage the tribunal has only to conclude that the facts found could lead them to the
conclusion that there had been unlawful discrimination").
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from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the
claimant less favorably on the grounds of race."1 24 Therefore, before the
burden shifts to the respondent employer, the complainant must establish
that he or she was treated less favorably and present sufficient facts that
permit the tribunal to conclude that the less favorable treatment complained
of, was on unlawful racial grounds.125 If the complainant fails to prove
such facts, the complaint will not succeed, and the tribunal ceases from
further inquiry.126 In drawing an inference of discrimination, the tribunal
examines all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint, in
disregard of whether the complainant or the respondent presented the
facts. 127
Any explanation, however adequate or inadequate, is of no relevance
while the tribunal is in the first stage of the process. 128 Consideration of an
explanation from the respondent at the first stage is inconsistent with the
statutory amendments and should not be entertained until the burden of
proof shifts to the respondent.129 The Employment Tribunal is required to
assume that there is no adequate explanation for the purpose of shifting the
burden of proof to the employer at the second stage, so that in the absence
of an adequate explanation, the complainant will succeed.130 If the
complainant establishes its prima facie case on the balance of probabilities,
then and only then does the onus shift to the respondent to prove that it did
not commit an unlawful act of discrimination.131
At the second stage, the respondent is required to put forth an adequate
explanation for its treatment of the complainant.132 To discharge its burden,
the respondent must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the
124 Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, Annex (9).
125 See AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975:
BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (Austl. Human Rights and Equal Opportuntity Comm'n, 2008), available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial discrimination/publications/int-comparison/RDA int comparison.pdf
(describing how the complainant need only establish they were treated less favorably).
126 Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 76, Annex (2).
127 See id at para. 24 (explaining that aeven though the language of the statutory amendments
refers to the complainant's duty to prove facts, evidence from the respondent may also be considered);
see also Madarassy, [2007] I.R.L.R. 246 at para. 8 (establishing that the scope of evidence to be
considered includes both evidence adduced by the complainant in support of his or her allegations, as
well as evidence adduced by the respondent contesting the complaint).
128 See Igen, [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 22.
129 See id.; see also Madarassy, [2007] I.R.L.R. 2446 at 8 (discussing that the absence of an
explanation only become relevant if the complainant discharges its burden on the prima facie case).
130 See Igen [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, para. 21-22.
131 See id. at para. 17.
132 See id. (describing an adequate explanation as one which proves that respondent did not
commit or is not to be treated as having committed the unlawful act); see also St. Christopher's
Fellowship v. Walters-Ennis, 2009 WL 3122398 at *7.
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treatment was in no sense whatsoever based on racial grounds.133 In
providing a non-discriminatory explanation, the respondent must present
cogent evidence.134 "Cogent" means forceful or persuasive, and where the
Employment Tribunal concludes the respondent's facts and arguments are
forceful and persuasive, the burden of proof will be discharged.135 The
Employment Tribunal, therefore, must make an assessment regarding
whether the respondent has established that in no sense whatsoever did it
discriminate based on racial grounds and that it is adequate to discharge the
burden of proof that race was not a ground of the respondent's treatment of
the complainant.136
Under the reverse statutory burden of proof, the respondent is required to
establish more than under the King and Zafar approaches. In the second
stage, the respondent must prove that it did not discriminate against the
complainant unlawfully, and thus it must provide an adequate explanation
and establish that the proffered explanation is true. 137 Where the
respondent fails to discharge this burden of proof, the Employment
Tribunal is compelled by statute to find against the respondent and uphold
the complainant's complaint.138 The U.K. approach encompasses the belief
that, "since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be
in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect
cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof." 39
IV. COMPARISON OF THE US AND UK
The U.S. and the U.K. have adopted analytical frameworks for analyzing
whether an employee has been subjected to unlawful racial discrimination
by his or her employer. While both approaches recognize the rarity of
proving racial discrimination by direct evidence, the U.K. framework goes
beyond simply permitting proof by circumstantial evidence, through
shifting the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to the
employer after the employee establishes its prima facie case. In doing so,
the U.K. approach, unlike that taken in the U.S., provides employees with a
framework that can lead to more successful litigation. The analytical
133 See Igen [2005] I.R.L.R. 258, Annex (11).
134 See Walters-Ennis, 2009 WL 3122398 at *6.
135 See Dresdner, [2005] I.R.L.R. 514, para. 41 (citing Nagarajan v. London Reg'1 Transp., [1999]
I.R.L.R. 512 (Eng.)).
136 Igen, [2005] 1.R.L.R. 258, Annex (2).
137 Id.
138 Dresdner, [2005] I.R.L.R. 514, para. 3.
139 Igen, [2005] L.R.L.R. 258, Annex (13).
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frameworks implemented in each country have significant differences,
which are exhibited through the language each legislature chose in
formulating the respective framework and in the underlying intent for its
construction.
A. Language Formulating Each Framework
In the United States, the burden of production shifts to the employer
upon the employee establishing a prima facie case of unlawful racial
discrimination.140 Following the prima facie showing, the employer must
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse
employment action which the employee alleged constituted unlawful
conduct.141 Throughout case law, the courts have made it clear that the
burden-shifting framework employed, does not shift the burden of
persuasion to the employer.142 The burden of persuasion is intended to
remain upon the employee at all times throughout the case. 143
On the contrary, in the U.K., a higher burden is placed on the employer.
In order for employees in the U.K. to make a prima facie showing, the
employee is required to "establish . . . from facts which it may be presumed
that there has been direct or indirect discrimination." 44 After the prima
facie case has been proved, the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion shift to the employer, which then must prove that it did not
commit the unlawful discriminatory conduct.145
B. Underlying Intent
The U.K. adopted the Burden of Proof directive established by the
European Council, which was intended to provide a burden of proof
scheme that was more effective at eliminating unlawful discrimination and
instating its fundamental principle of equality. 146 The language of the
directive expressly states that it "shall not prevent Member States from
introducing rules of evidence which are more favorable to plaintiffs."' 47
This language is an indication of an unambiguous desire to assist plaintiff
140 McDonnell Douglas-Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
141 Id
142 See id.
143 See id
144 Council Directive 97/80, art. 4, 1997 O.J. (L 14) 6, 8 (EC).
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 Id.
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employees in proving racial discrimination. Additionally the directive
requires that after the employee has met its prima facie showing, the
employer must "prove that there has been no breach of the principle of
equal treatment."148
During the proposal for creating the directive, the committee recognized
that the general rule placed the burden of proving the case on the individual
bringing the claim. 149 However, despite such acknowledgment, the general
rule did not trump the desire to provide greater assistance to the plaintiff.
The final recognition rested with a realization that shifting the burden of
proof to the employer to prove it did not discriminate against the employee
on prohibited grounds, was essential since the employer possesses the
relevant information for the discrimination case. 150 This position, that the
employee is at a disadvantage since the employer possesses and therefore
has greater access to the information required to satisfy its burden, is
exhibited throughout the case law in the U.K.
C. Policy Concerns
The requisite burden of proof allocated to each party is a key factor
influencing the outcome of litigation. As a result, a burden of proof that
places an extremely heavy burden on the employee will permit the
employer to perpetuate a cycle of discrimination without suffering from the
consequences of its actions. However, placing an extremely heavy burden
upon the employer will subject the employer to justifying all its
employment actions and significantly interfere in its business decisions.
The chosen burden of proof allocation signifies the general outlook of
courts, legislators, and society for providing which party will be favored in
litigation. 15 1
The U.K. policy rationale imposes a pro-employee approach, whereas
the U.S. has a pro-employer outlook. The overall objective in the U.K. is
to encourage employers to prevent unlawful discriminatory conduct that
may result in its liability.152 On the other hand, the U.S. is influenced by its
148 Id.
149 See Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Con/99/0566 (proposed Nov. 25, 1999) [hereinafter
Proposal for Race Directive].
150 See Council Directive 97/80, art. 4, 1997 O.J. (L 14) 6, 8 (EC).
151 See Engels, supra note 85, at 368.
152 See Jarrett Haskovec, A Beast of a Burden? The New EU Burden-of-Proof Arrangement in
Cases of Employment Discrimination Compared to Existing US. Law, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp.
Probs. 1069, 1100 (2005).
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preference for a deregulated labor market and laissez-faire capitalism.153
The employment-at-will doctrine is indicative of the desire for minimal
intrusion into private employment relationships.1 54
V. PROVING A LEGITIMATE, NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON
In passing Title VII, Congress intended to "assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices
and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens." 55 Permitting the employer to rebut the
prima facie case put forth by the employee simply by presenting a
nondiscriminatory reason discounts the relative ease of articulating a
reason. An employer's intent to discriminate against its employee can be
disguised in a variety of ways. Margaret Thornton argues that the concept
of merit "conveys a veneer of neutrality ... but, in fact, is capable of
disguising racism." Proposing to shift the burden of persuasion, along with
the burden of production, to the employer in the second prong of the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework is not meant to indicate that
racial discrimination is so serious that employees should have a less
onerous burden of proof. Rather, it represents an acknowledgment of the
problems facing an employee.156 In light of the fact that many argue that
we are living in a post-racial era, the reality is that discrimination is just
more subtle today, so it is harder to detect.
In Australia, the tribunal reasoned that racial discrimination accusations
are serious matters that result in grave consequences and pose an undue
burden on employers. I do not propose the United States judicial system
adopt this view. As a result of this line of thought, complainants are faced
with the arduous task of proving their complaint of race discrimination to
an extremely high burden of proof. The standard of proof when dealing
with a allegation for breach of the Racial Discrimination Act is the higher
standard referred to in Bringinshaw.157 While Australia prohibits racial
153 See Haskovec, supra note 152, at 1093 (identifying the United States as having a traditional
pro-market, anti-state ideology).
154 See Haskovec, supra note 152, at 1093-94 (noting that the United States is reluctant to
intervene in the private relationship of employers and employees).
155 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
156 See Laing v. Manchester City Council, [2006] I.C.R. 1519, para. 71 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.)
(revealing that employees would face problems of proof if at every stage of the judicial process the
employee was confronted with the probability that the employer's treatment was because of the
employee's race).
157 See Sharma v Legal Aid Queensland [2002] FCR 196, at *7 (Austl.) (stating that at first
instance the standard of proof for breaches of the RDA is the higher of the standards discussed in
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discrimination through the RDA, in its application the courts have a naive
outlook as to the existence of such discrimination within the country. The
root of the problem with the burden of proof allocation in Australia stems
from the system's desire to turn a blind eye to the existence of racism. 158
The tribunals in Australia take a misguided approach to the presence of
discrimination. In Cubillo v. Commonwealth of Australia,159 the court
reasoned that the application of the Briginshaw standard imposing a higher
evidentiary burden upon the employee is validated by the general absence
of racial discrimination.160 The court stated it should be understood as
"merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society
do not ordinarily engage in [such] conduct."l61 The court continuously
reiterates this outlook when deciding the applicability of the Briginshaw
standard. For example, in Dutt v. Central Coast Area Health Service, the
court proposed a two step approach that involved examining the nature of
the allegation and reaching a determination if it would have a reasonably
foreseeable adverse consequence upon the respondent's livelihood or
reputation, and if it did, then and only then does the court apply the
Briginshaw standard.162 As a result, the court explained that a finding of
racial discrimination should not be lightly made, but should be cautiously
reached.163
Far from the approach in Australia, in the United States and the United
Kingdom there is some onus placed on the employer to provide an
explanation that its complained of conduct, was not discriminatory as the
prima facie case explains, either by providing that its actions were not
discriminatory in nature on the balance of probabilities, as in the U.K.,164
or by merely providing an articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason to rebut the prima facie case, as in the U.S.165 Contrary to the line of
reasoning in Australia, the United States should not adopt an outlook that
discrimination on racial grounds is inherently unlikely.
Bringshaw).
158 See Cubillo v Cth. Austl. [2000] 174 ALR 97, at *344-45 (characterizing people who would not
acknowledge Aboriginal culture and were only interested in assimilating Aboriginal children into the
European mainstream as well-meaning and well-intentioned).
159 Id. at*1.
160 See id.
161 Id (citing Neat Holding Pty Ltd v. Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 A.L.R. 449,450).
162 See Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 133, para. 55-57; see also De
Plevitz, supra note 66, at 327.
163 See Cubillo [2000] 174 ALR at 97 (citing G v H [1994] 181 CLR at 399).
164 The approach implemented throughout the U.K. is the same approach throughout the European
Union.
165 The approach implemented throughout the U.S. is similar to the approach throughout Canada.
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I propose a shift in the current individual disparate treatment framework
similar to the burden of proof framework outlined in Section 54A of the
RRA.166 In reconstructing the McDonnell Douglas framework, the United
States should adopt a burden-shifting scheme that requires the employer to
prove a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment
action against the complainant. Through shifting the burden of persuasion,
as well as the burden of production to the employer, the court will move
closer to assuring equality in employment and eliminating discriminatory
practices and devices, as Title VII intended.167 While the Supreme Court
has said that at all times the employee bears the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination and the employer need not disprove discrimination, our
proposal comes short of that requirement. We require merely that the
employer prove that its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is its true
reason for its actions. We find that this extra burden on the employer is
warranted in light of the fact that discriminatory motive is harder to find
today because of its subtle nature.
The United Kingdom's burden of proof was implemented in recognition
of the fact that the difficulty of proving a racial discrimination claim
against one's employer increases where the employee bears the burden of
proving discrimination by reason of race at all stages. 168 The court
explained that the legislative amendments to the burden of proof reflect the
"emphasis on effective protection for those who are the victims of
discrimination, and the need for the principle of equal treatment to be
applied effectively." 69 At first glance it appears that the U.S. Supreme
Court reached a similar acknowledgement of the difficulty in proving race
discrimination in employment cases when it articulated that the employee's
establishment of its prima facie case raises an inference of
discrimination.170 The court explained its willingness to provide such an
inference extended from the realization that "people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting."1 71 However, the court went on to clarify that while the prima facie
case gives rise to an inference of discrimination, once the employer
articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that inference drops
166 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 54A (Eng.).
167 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at n. 120.
168 See Laing, 2006 WL 2334271 at *10.
169 Dresdner, 2005 I.R.L.R. 514, para. 39.
170 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
171 Id.
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from the case. 172 The inference is removed because the prima facie case is
insufficient to merit judgment for the plaintiff on its own.173 The court in
Hicks explained that the prima facie case provides a rebuttable inference of
discrimination, that where established does not compel judgment for the
plaintiff.174
In order to provide greater Title VII protection, the United States should
adopt the second prong of the U.K. approach, in light of the widespread
acknowledgment that, in making an employment decision, the employer
does not act arbitrarily. The court should depart from the current
McDonnell Douglas framework, and require the employer to prove the
factual validity of its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 175 The court's
reasoning that the employer will be motivated to present persuasive
evidence to the fact finder that its employment action was lawful,
regardless of only having the burden of production, is overly optimistic.
Under the current framework the employer does not need to be actually
motivated by the proffered reason. "If an employer need only articulate -
not prove - a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action, he may
compose fictitious, but legitimate reasons for his actions."1 76
By requiring the employer to prove legitimate reasons, the employer
would not be required to bear the burden on the ultimate question of
discrimination vel non.177 The employer should not be required to bear a
burden of rebutting the employee's prima facie case, by proving a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason, where the employee's prima facie
case does not create a mandatory inference of discrimination on its own
merits. In order to strike a balance between precluding recovery and not
subjecting employers to unwarranted findings of discrimination, rather than
shift the entire burden, of both production and persuasion to the employer,
the employer would simply be required to prove the validity of the reason it
offered, not that he did not in fact discriminate.
172 Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 N.10 (1980).
173 See generally St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 502 (1993) see also Burdine, 450
U.S. 248.
174 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517.
175 Discussion with Professor D. Aaron Lacy, Associate Professor of Law at SMU Dedman School
of Law (April 22, 2010).
176 See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1997)
177 See Vel Non, is Latin for 'or not'. The court in Hicks explained that the ultimate question in the
employment discrimination case, is discrimination vel non, or whether there was discrimination or not.
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CONCLUSION
There is "no reason why Title VII interpretation should be driven by
concern for employers who are too ashamed to be honest in court, at the
expense of victims of discrimination." 7 8
Of the three national jurisdictions discussed throughout this paper, the
Australian jurisdiction was the only jurisdiction to apply a higher
evidentiary standard to allegations of racial discrimination. Its higher
standard of evidence, taken in combination with a burden of proof that
never shifts to the employer, but instead remains with the plaintiff
throughout the litigation, indicates the difficulty of proving claims of racial
discrimination in the workplace. In comparison to the Australian approach,
which puts an excessive restriction on employees, the U.S. and the U.K. are
both more beneficial to employees.
While both the U.S. and the U.K. require the employee to present certain
requisite facts prior to permitting a burden to shift to the employer, the U.S.
is more demanding on employees in that it simply shifts the burden of
production to the employer. In order to be more cognizable of the purpose
of Title VII and eradicating unlawful employment discrimination against
employees in regards to their terms, conditions or privileges or
employment, the U.S. should adopt the second-prong of the U.K.
framework and require the employer to prove reliance on its legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, and move beyond the mere articulation
requirement. In today's society, employers will be able to present a mere
articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, particularly where
the courts have expressly held the employer does not need to show the
proffered reason actually motivated the employer.
I acknowledge that this proposal will not eradicate all the difficulties that
employees face when bringing a claim for racial discrimination against
their employer. There will of course be times where an employer's
discriminatory animus based on the employee's race will fall under a
veneer of neutrality. The proposal that the U.S. move beyond the mere
articulation of the current allocation of the burden of proof, and follow an
approach similar to the in the U.K., is aimed at providing a more effective
and equal basis for resolving racial discrimination claims in employment
law.
178 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 543.
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